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Abstract—In this paper, we study the privacy of online health
data. We present a novel online health data De-Anonymization
(DA) framework, named De-Health. De-Health consists of two
phases: Top-K DA, which identifies a candidate set for each
anonymized user, and refined DA, which de-anonymizes an
anonymized user to a user in its candidate set. By employing
both candidate selection and DA verification schemes, De-Health
significantly reduces the DA space by several orders of magnitude
while achieving promising DA accuracy. Leveraging two real
world online health datasets WebMD (89,393 users, 506K posts)
and HealthBoards (388,398 users, 4.7M posts), we validate the
efficacy of De-Health. Further, when the training data are
insufficient, De-Health can still successfully de-anonymize a large
portion of anonymized users.
We develop the first analytical framework on the soundness
and effectiveness of online health data DA. By analyzing the
impact of various data features on the anonymity, we derive
the conditions and probabilities for successfully de-anonymizing
one user or a group of users in exact DA and Top-K DA. Our
analysis is meaningful to both researchers and policy makers
in facilitating the development of more effective anonymization
techniques and proper privacy polices.
We present a linkage attack framework which can link online
health/medical information to real world people. Through a
proof-of-concept attack, we link 347 out of 2805 WebMD users
to real world people, and find the full names, medical/health
information, birthdates, phone numbers, and other sensitive
information for most of the re-identified users. This clearly
illustrates the fragility of the notion of privacy of those who
use online health forums.
I. INTRODUCTION
Status Quo. The advance of information technologies has
greatly transformed the delivery means of healthcare services:
from traditional hospitals/clinics to various online healthcare
services. This fact can be well explained by Charles Simmons,
a software engineer in Los Angeles, California [8].
In 1997, after experiencing a variety of symptoms for
which doctors had no explanation, Simmons turned
to the Web for answers and support. When he did not
find online support groups in the areas he needed, he
realized that there was a need for a health support
website covering a wide range of health topics.
Ever since their introduction, online health services expe-
rienced rapid growth, and have had millions of users and
accumulated billions of users’ medical/health records [6][7].
According to several national surveys, ∼ 59% of US adults
have employed the Internet (online health information) as a
diagnostic tool in 2012 [1], and on average, the US consumers
spend ∼ 52 hours annually to search for and peruse online
health information while only visiting doctors three times
per year in 2013 [2]. Moreover, “on an average day, 6%
of the US Internet users perform online medical searches to
better prepare for doctors’ appointments and to better digest
information obtained from doctors afterwards” [3]. Therefore,
online health services play a more important role in people’s
daily life.
When serving users (we use patients and users interchange-
ably in this paper), the online health services accumulate
a huge amount of the users’ health data. For instance, as
one of the leading American corporations that provide health
news, advice, and expertise [4][5], WebMD reached an average
of approximately 183 million monthly unique visitors and
delivered approximately 14.25 billion page views in 2014 [6].
Another leading health service provider, HealthBoards (HB),
has over 10 million monthly visitors, 850,000 registered mem-
bers, and over 4.5 million health-related/medical messages
posted [7]. Due to the high value of enabling low-cost, large-
scale data mining and analytics tasks, e.g., disease transmis-
sion and control research [41], disease inference [17], and
predicting future instances of domestic abuse [42], those user-
generated health data are increasingly shared, disseminated,
and published for research [23], business [5][8], government
applications [9][10], and other scenarios [23][27].
Privacy Issues of Online Health Data. In addition to
the high value for various applications, online health data
carry numerous sensitive details of the users that generate
them [23][27][28]. Therefore, before sharing, disseminating,
and publishing the health data, proper privacy protection
mechanisms should be applied and privacy policies should be
followed. However, the reality is that it is still an open problem
for protecting online health data’s privacy with respect to both
the technical perspective and the policy perspective.
From the technical perspective, most existing health data
anonymization techniques (which are called de-identification
techniques in the medical and policy literature [23][28]), e.g.,
the techniques in [18]-[23], if not all, focus on protecting
the privacy of structured medical/health data that are usually
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2generated from hospitals, clinics, and/or other official medi-
cal agencies (e.g., labs, government agencies). Nevertheless,
putting aside their performance and effectiveness, existing
privacy protection techniques for structured health data can
hardly be applied to online health data due to the follow-
ing reasons [13][14][17]. (i) Structure and heterogeneity:
the structured health data are well organized with structured
fields while online health data are usually heterogeneous and
structurally complex. (ii) Scale: a structured health dataset
usually consists of the records of tens of users to thousands
of users [18]-[23], while an online health dataset can contain
millions of users [6][7][17]. (iii) Threat: Compared to online
health data, the dissemination of structured health data is
usually easier to control, and thus the potential of a privacy
compromise is less likely. Due to its open-to-public nature,
however, the online health data dissemination is difficult to
control, and adversaries may employ multiple kinds of means
and auxiliary information to compromise the data’s privacy
(we will show this later in this paper).
From the policy making perspective, taking the US Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) [11]
as an example, although HIPAA sets forth methodologies for
anonymizing health data (including online health data), once
the data are anonymized, they are no longer subject to HIPAA
regulations and can be used for any purpose. However, when
anonymizing the data, HIPAA does not specify any concrete
technique other than high-level guidelines. Therefore, naive
anonymization technique may be applied.
Our Work. Toward helping users, researchers, data owners,
and policy makers comprehensively understand the privacy
vulnerability of online health data, we study the privacy of
online health data. Specifically, we focus on the health data
generated on online health forums like WebMD [4] and HB
[7] in this paper. These forums disseminate personalized health
information and provide a community-based platform for con-
necting patients with doctors and other patients via interactive
question and answering, symptom analysis, medication advice
and side effect warning, and other interactions [4][7][13].
As we mentioned earlier, a significant amount of medical
records have been accumulated in the repositories of these
health websites. According to the website privacy policies
[4][7], they explicitly state that they collect personal informa-
tion of users (patients), including contact information, payment
information, geographic location information, personal profile,
medical information, transaction information, Cookies, and
other sensitive information. For instance, in WebMD’s privacy
policy [4], they state that
We may collect “Personal Information” about you
– such as your name, address, telephone number,
email address or health information · · · We may
collect “Non-Personal Information” – information
that cannot be used by us to identify you – via
Cookies, Web Beacons, WebMD mobile device ap-
plications and from external sources, even if you
have not registered with or provided any Personal
Information to WebMD · · ·
and similarly, in HB’ privacy policy [7],
We collect personal information for various business
purposes when you interact with us · · · We collect
information about you in two basic ways: First,
we receive information directly from you. Second,
through use of cookies and other technologies, we
keep track of your interactions · · ·
To use those online health services, users have to accept their
privacy policies. For instance, in HB’ privacy policy, it is
explicitly indicated that “if you do not agree to this privacy
policy, please do not use our sites or services”. Therefore,
using the online health services requires the enabling of
those service providers like WebMD and HB to collect users’
personal informaiton.
As stated, the collected personal information will be used
for research and various business purposes, e.g., data min-
ing tasks and precise advertisements from pharmaceutical
companies. Although these medical records are only affili-
ated with some user-chosen pseudonyms or anonymized IDs,
some natural questions arise: when those data are shared
with commercial partners (one of the most typical various
business purposes)1, or published for research, or collected by
adversaries, can they be de-anonymized even if the patients
who generated them are anonymized? and can those medical
records be connected to real world people? In this paper,
we answer these two questions by (i) proposing a novel
online health data De-Anonymization (DA) framework; (ii)
providing a general theoretical analysis for the soundness and
effectiveness of online health data DA; and (iii) discussing
how to link the medical records to real world people. We also
discuss the implications of our findings to online health data
privacy researchers, users, as well as policy makers.
Our Contributions. Our key contributions are the follow-
ing:
(1) We present a novel DA framework, named De-Health,
for large-scale online health data. De-Health is a two-phase
DA framework. In the first phase, De-Health performs Top-
K DA. It first constructs a User-Data-Attribute (UDA) graph
based on the data correlation among users, and then identifies
structural features (i.e., graph features) from the UDA graph.
Leveraging those structural features, a Top-K candidate set is
constructed for each anonymized user. In the second phase,
refined DA is performed. Leveraging both correlation and
stylometric features of an anonymized user and the users in
her corresponding Top-K candidate set, De-Health trains a
classifier using benchmark machine learning techniques to de-
anonymize the anonymized user to some user in its candidate
set. De-Health has two distinguishing features: (i) by utilizing
the UDA graph and Top-K candidate sets, it can be easily
scaled to large-scale health data with high accuracy preserva-
tion; and (ii) De-Health can be applied to both closed-world
DA (each anonymized user appears in the training/auxiliary
1The business model (revenue model) of most online health forums is
advertisement based [5][7].
3data) and open-world DA (there are some anonymized users
that may not appear in the training/auxiliary data).
(2) We provide a general theoretical analysis framework for
the soundness and effectiveness of online health data DA. In
the framework, we analyze the impacts of structural features
and stylometric features on the anonymity of health data.
Specifically, we quantify the conditions and probabilities of
successfully de-anonymizing (including exact DA and Top-K
DA) one user or a group of users. The theoretical analysis
has meaningful implications to health data privacy research
and policy making: understanding the impacts of features on
the data’s anonymity will facilitate researchers and policy
makers to develop more effective anonymization techniques
and proper privacy policies.
(3) Leveraging two real world online health datasets
WebMD (89,393 users, 506K posts) and HB (388,398 users,
4.7M posts), we conduct extensive evaluations to examine the
performance of De-Health in closed-world and open-world
DA settings. The results show that the Top-K DA of De-
Health is very powerful on large-scale datasets. By seeking
a Top-K candidate set for each anonymized user, the DA
space is effectively decreased by several orders of magnitude
while providing high accuracy preservation, which enables the
development of an elegant machine learning based classifier
for refined DA. Even when little data are available for training,
De-Health can still achieve a satisfying DA performance,
which significantly outperforms the traditional DA approach.
(4) We present a linkage attack framework, which can link
online health service users to other Internet services as well
as real world people. We validate the framework leveraging
proof-of-concept attacks. For instance, it can successfully link
347 out of 2805 (i.e., 12.4%) target WebMD users to real
world people, and find most of their full names, medical/health
information, birthdates, phone numbers, addresses, and other
sensitive information. Thus, those users’ privacy can be com-
promised and one can learn the sexual orientation and related
infectious diseases, mental/psychologicla problems, and suici-
dal tendency from some users’ health/medial data.
II. DATA COLLECTION & FEATURE EXTRACTION
A. Data Collection
We collect online medical postings from two leading US
online health services providers WebMD [4] and HB [7]. As
the leading health portal in the US [5], WebMD provides
valuable health information and tools for managing its users’
health, and support to those who seek online health infor-
mation. HB provides a one-stop support group community
offering more than 200 message boards on various diseases,
conditions, and health topics. It was rated as one of the top
20 health information websites by Consumer Reports Health
WebWatch [7][8]. We collected the health data of WebMD and
HB registered users for approximately 4 months, from May
to August, 2015. This collection process resulted in 540,183
webpages from WebMD and 2,596,433 webpages from HB.
After careful analysis and processing, we extracted 506,370
disease/condition/medcine posts that were generated by 89,393
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registered users from the WebMD dataset (5.66 posts/user on
average) and 4,682,281 posts that were generated by 388,398
registered users from the HB dataset (12.06 posts/user on
average). We show some example posts from WebMD and
HB in Appendix A. From the example posts, we can see that
a lot of sensitive information of the users can be learned.
We show the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of the
number of users with respect to the number of posts in Fig.1,
from which we observe that most of the users only have a few
posts, e.g., 87.3% WebMD users and 75.4% HB users have
less than 5 posts. We further show the length distribution of
the posts in WebMD and HB in terms of the number of words
in Fig.2. Most of the posts in the two datasets have a length
less than 300 words. On average, the length of WebMD posts
is 127.59 and the length of HB posts is 147.24.
B. User-Data-Attribute Graph & Feature Extraction
User Correlation Graph. Online health services provide
a platform for connecting patients via interactive disease and
symptom discussion, health question answering, medicine and
possible side effect advice, etc. For instance, on WebMD and
HB, when one disease topic is raised by some user, other users
may join the discussion of this topic by providing suggestions,
sharing experience, making comments, etc. Due to this fact,
HB is also classified as a health-oriented social networking
service [8].
Therefore, if we take such user interactivity into
consideration, there is some correlation, i.e., the co-
disease/health/medicine discussion relation, among users. To
characterize such interactivity, we construct a user correlation
graph based on the relationships among the data (posts) of
4different users. Particularly, for each user in the WebMD/HB
dataset, we represent him/her as a node in the correlation
graph. For two users i and j, if they post under the same
health/disease topic, i.e., they made posts on the same topic
initialized by some user (could be i, j, or some other user),
we consider that there is an undirected edge, denoted by eij ,
between i and j. Furthermore, we note that the number of
interactive discussions between different pairs of users might
be different. Therefore, we assign a weight for each edge to
characterize the interactivity strength, which is defined as the
number of times that the corresponding two users co-discussed
under the same topic.
Now, we formally define the user correlation graph as
G = (V,E,W ), where V = {1, 2, · · · , n} denotes the set
of users, E = {eij |i, j ∈ V } denotes the set of edges
among users, and W = {wij | for eij ∈ E,wij is the weight
(interactivity strength) associated with edge eij}. For i ∈ V ,
we define its neighborhood as Ni = {j|eij ∈ E}. Let
di = |Ni| be the number of neighbor users of i, i.e., the
degree of user i. When taking the weight information into
consideration, we define wdi =
∑
j∈Ni
wij to be the weighted
degree of i. For our following application, we also define
a Neighborhood Correlation Strength (NCS) vector for each
user. Specifically, for i ∈ V , its NCS vector is defined as
Di =< w
′
ij |j ∈ Ni >, where < w′ij |j ∈ Ni > is a decreasing
order sequence of {wij |j ∈ Ni}. Given i, j ∈ V , we define
the distance (resp., weighted distance) between i and j as the
length of the shortest path from i to j in G when the weight
information is overlooked (resp., considered), denoted by hij
(resp., whij).
We analyze the degree distributions of the WebMD graph
and the HB graph, as well as the community structure of
the WebMD graph in Appendix B. Basically the graph’s
connectivity is not strong (average degree is low and graph
is not connected).
Stylometric Features. Using writing style for author attri-
bution can be traced back to the 19th century [43]. Recently,
stylometric approaches have been applied to broad security
and privacy issues, from author attribution [29][31][32] to
fraud and deception detection [33], underground cybercriminal
analysis [34], and programmer DA [35]. According to the
findings in those applications, users have distinctive writing
styles (especially, in the non-adversarial scenario). Thus, when
providing sufficient data (written materials, e.g., blogs, docu-
ments, passages), many users can be uniquely identified/de-
anonymized from a (large) group of candidate users using
benchmark machine learning models trained by their stylomet-
ric features [29][30][31][32]. Furthermore, as demonstrated in
[33], it is difficult for users to intentionally obfuscate their
writing style or attempt to imitate the writing styles of others
in a long term. Moreover, even that happens, with a high
probability, specific linguistic features can still be extracted
from the long term written materials to identify the users.
Therefore, for our purpose, we seek to employ the linguistic
features of the health data (posts written by users) to de-
TABLE I
STYLOMETRIC FEATURES.
Category Description Count
Length # of characters and paragraphs,average # of characters per word 3
Word Length freq. of words of different lengths 20
Vocabulary
richness
Yule’s K, hapax /tris/dis/tetrakis
legomena 5
Letter freq. freq. of ‘a/A’ ∼ ‘z/Z’ 26
Digit freq. freq. of ‘0’ ∼ ‘9’ 10
Uppercase letter
percentage % of uppercase letters in a post 1
Special characters freq. of special characters 21
Word shape
freq. of all uppercase words, all
lowercase words, first character
uppercase words, camel case words
21
Punctuation freq. freq. of punctuation, e.g., !,;? 10
Function words freq. of function words 337
POS tags freq. of POS tags, e.g., NP, JJ < 2300
POS tag bigrams freq. of POS tag bigrams < 23002
Misspelled words freq. of misspellings 248
anonymize the associated users.
We extract various stylometric features from the WebMD
and HB datasets as shown in Table I. Generally, the features
in Table I can be classified into three groups: lexical fea-
tures, syntactic features, and idiosyncratic features. The lexical
features include length, word length, vocabulary richness,
letter frequency, digit frequency, uppercase letter percentage,
special characters, and word shape. They measure the writing
style of users with respect to characteristics of employed
characters, words, and vocabularies. The syntactic features
include punctuation frequency, function words, POS tags, and
POS tag bigrams. They measure the writing style of users with
respect to the arrangement of words and phrases to create
well-formed sentences in posts. For idiosyncratic features,
we consider misspelled words, which measure some peculiar
writing style of users.
Since the number of POS tags and POS tag bigrams could be
variable, the number of total features is denoted by a variable
M for convenience. According to the feature descriptions,
all the features are real and positive valued. Without loss of
generality, we organize the features as a vector, denoted by
F =< F1, F2, · · · , FM >. Then, given a post, we extract
its features with respect to F and obtain a feature vector
consisting of 0 and positive real values, where 0 implies that
this post does not have the corresponding feature while a
positive real value implies that this post has the corresponding
feature.
Note that, it is possible to extract more stylometric features
from the WebMD/HB dataset, e.g., content features [29]. How-
ever, in this paper, we mainly focus on developing an effective
online health data DA framework. For the feature extraction
part, we mainly employ the existing techniques such as those
in [29]-[37], and thus we do not consider this part as the
technical contribution of this paper. Certainly, understanding
5which features are more effective in de-anonymizing online
health data is an interesting topic to study. We take this as the
future work of this paper.
User-Data-Attribute Graph and Structural Features.
Previously, we constructed a correlation graph G for the users
in a health dataset. Now, we extend G to a User-Data-Attribute
(UDA) graph. As the stylometric features demonstrate the
writing characteristics of users, logically, they can also be
considered as the attributes of users, which are similar to
the social attributes of users, e.g., career, gender, citizenship.
Therefore, at the user level, we define an attribute set/space,
denoted by A, based on F, i.e., A = {Ai|Ai = Fi, i =
1, 2, · · · ,M}. Then, following this idea, for each feature
Fi ∈ F, if a user u has a post that has feature Fi (i.e., the
Fi dimension is not 0 in the feature vector of that post), we
say u has attribute Ai, denoted by u ∼ Ai. Note that, each
attribute is actually binary to a user, i.e., a user either has
an atrribute Ai or not, which is different from the feature,
which could be either a continuous or a discrete real value.
We define A(u) as the set of all the attributes that user u
has, i.e., A(u) = {Ai|Ai ∈ A, u ∼ Ai}. Since u may have
multiple posts that have feature Fi, we assign a weight to the
relation u ∼ Ai, denoted by lu(Ai), which is defined as the
number of posts authored by u that have the feature Fi.
Based on the attribute definition, we extend the correlation
graph to the UDA graph, denoted by G = (V,E,W,A,O,L),
where V , E, and W are the same as defined before, A is the
attribute set, O = {u ∼ Ai|u ∈ V,Ai ∈ A} denotes the set of
all the user-attribute relationships, and L = {lu(Ai)|u ∼ Ai ∈
O} denotes the set of the user-attribute relationship weights.
Since the UDA graph is an extension of the correlation graph,
we use the same notation G for these two concepts. In practice,
one may consider more attributes of a user, e.g., their social
attributes (user’s social information) and behavioral attributes
(user’s activity pattern), when defining A.
From the definition of the UDA graph G, we can see that it
takes into account the data’s correlation as well as the data’s
linguistic features (by introducing the concept of attribute in
a different way compared to the traditional manner [29]-[37]).
We will introduce how to use the UDA graph to conduct the
user-level DA and analyze the benefits in the following section.
Before that, we introduce more user-level features from the
health data leveraging the UDA graph.
The features extracted from the UDA graph are classified
as structural features, which can be partitioned into three cat-
egories: local correlation features, global correlation features,
and attribute features. The local correlation features include
user degree (i.e., du for u ∈ V ), weighted degree (i.e., wdu),
and NCS vector (i.e., Di). Basically, the local correlation
features measure the direct interactivity of a user in a health
forum.
Given u ∈ V and a subset S ⊆ V , the global correlation
features of u are defined as the the distances and weighted
distances from u to the users in S, denoted by vectors
Hu(S) =< huv|v ∈ S > and WHu(S) =< whuv|v ∈ S >,
respectively. Basically, the global correlation features measure
the indirect interactivity of a user in a health dataset.
Based on A(u) of u ∈ V , we introduce a new notation to
take into account the weight of each attribute of u. We define
WA(u) = {(Ai, lu(Ai))|Ai ∈ A(u)}. Then, the attribute
features of u ∈ V are defined as A(u) and WA(u). The
attribute features measure the linguistic features of users in
the form of binary attributes and weighted binary attributes.
The defined structural features are helpful in conducting
user-level DA. We show this in detail in the De-Health
framework as well as in the experimental evaluations.
III. DE-ANONYMIZATION
A. Preliminary
Before this work, the privacy vulnerability of online health
data was unclear, e.g., the health/medical data generated by
users of WebMD and HB, to the best of our knowledge. In
this section, we present a novel two-phase DA attack to online
health data. The considered anonymized data, denoted by ∆1,
are the data generated from current online health services,
e.g., WebMD and HB. There are multiple applications of
those anonymized online health data: (i) as indicated in the
privacy policies of WebMD and HB, the health data of their
users can be shared with researchers for multiple research and
analytics tasks [4][7]; (ii) again, according to their privacy
policies, the data could be shared with commercial partners
(e.g., insurance companies and pharmaceutical companies) for
multiple business purposes [4][7]; and (iii) the data might
be publicly released for multiple government and societal
applications [9][10]. Considering various applications of the
online health data, our question is: can those data be de-
anonymized to the users of online health services and can they
be linked to the users’ real identities? We answer the first part
of this question in this section by presenting De-Health and
discuss the second part in Section VI.
To de-anonymize the anonymized data ∆1, we assume that
the adversary2 can collect some auxiliary data, denoted by ∆2,
from the same or other online health service. According to our
knowledge, this is possible in practice: from the adversary’s
perspective, for some online health services, e.g., HB, it is
not difficult to collect data from them using some intelligent
crawling techniques; for some other online health services with
strict policies, e.g. PatientsLikeMe [12], an adversary can also
collect their data by combining intelligent crawling techniques
and anonymous communication techniques (e.g., Tor). In this
paper, we assume both ∆1 and ∆2 are generated from online
health services like WebMD and HB.
After obtaining the anonymized data ∆1 and the aux-
iliary data ∆2, we extract the features of the data and
transform them into an anonymized graph and an auxiliary
graph, denoted by G1 = (V1, E1,W1, A1, O1, L1) and G2 =
(V1, E1,W1, A1, O1, L1), respectively, using the techniques
2Here, the adversaries are defined as the ones who want to compromise
the privacy of the users in the anonymized dataset. During the data sharing
and publishing process (for research, business, and other purposes), every
data recipient could be an adversary. In our paper, we focus on studying the
potential privacy vulnerability of online health data.
6discussed in Section II. When it is necessary, we use the
subscript ‘1’ and ‘2’ to distinguish the anonymized data/graph
and the auxiliary data/graph. Now, the DA of ∆1 leveraging
∆2 can be approximately defined as: for an anonymized
(unknown) user u ∈ V1, seeking an auxiliary (known) user
v ∈ V2, such that u can be identified to v (i.e., they correspond
to the same real world person), denoted by u→ v. However,
in practice, it is unclear whether ∆1 and ∆2 are generated
by the same group of users, i.e., it is unknown whether
V1
?
= V2. Therefore, we define closed-world DA and open-
world DA. When the users that generate ∆1 are a subset of
the users that generate ∆2, i.e., V1 ⊆ V2, the DA problem is
a closed-world DA problem. Then, a successful DA is defined
as u ∈ V1, v ∈ V2, u→ v and u and v correspond to the same
user. When V1 6= V2, the DA problem is an open-world DA
problem. Let Vo = V1 ∩V2, the overlapping users between V1
and V2. Then, a successful DA is defined as u ∈ V1, v ∈ V2,
u→ v, u and v are in Vo, and u and v correspond to the same
user; or u→ ⊥, if u /∈ Vo, where ⊥ represents not-existence.
For u ∈ V1 and v ∈ V2, if u and v correspond to the same
real world user, we call v the true mapping of u in V2. In this
paper, the presented De-Health framework works for both the
closed-world and the open-world situations.
B. De-Health
Algorithm 1: De-Health
1 construct G1 and G2 from ∆1 and ∆2, respectively;
2 for every u ∈ V1 do
3 for every v ∈ V2 do
4 compute the structural similarity between u and
v, denoted by suv;
5 compute the Top-K candidate set for each user u ∈ V1,
denoted by Cu = {vi|vi ∈ V2, i = 1, 2, · · · ,K}, based
on the structural similarity scores;
6 filter Cu using a threshold vector;
7 for u ∈ V1 do
8 leveraging the stylometric and structural features of
the users in Cu, build a classifier, using benchmark
machine learning techniques (e.g., SMO);
9 using the classifier to de-anonymize u;
Overview. In this subsection, we present the De-Health
framework. We show the high level idea of De-Health in Algo-
rithm 1 and give the details later. At a high level, De-Health
conducts user DA in two phases: Top-K DA (line 2-6) and
refined DA (line 7-9). In the Top-K DA phase, we mainly focus
on de-anonymizing each anonymized user u ∈ V1 to a Top-K
candidate set, denoted by Cu = {vi|vi ∈ V2, i = 1, 2, · · · ,K},
that consists of the K most structurally similar auxiliary users
with the anonymized user (line 2-5). Then, we optimize the
Top-K candidate set using a threshold vector by eliminating
some less likely candidates (line 6). In the refined DA phase,
an anonymized user will be de-anonymized to some user in
the candidate set using a benchmark machine learning model
trained leveraging both stylometric and structural features.
Note that, we do not limit the DA scenario to closed-world or
open-world. De-Health is designed to take both scenarios into
consideration.
Top-K DA. Now, we discuss how to implement Top-K DA
and optimization (filtering).
Structural Similarity. Before we compute the Top-K candi-
date set for each anonymized user, we compute the structural
similarity between each anonymized user u ∈ V1 and each
auxiliary user v ∈ V2, denoted by suv , from the graph
perspective (line 2-3 in Algorithm 1). In De-Health, suv
consists of three components: degree similarity sduv , distance
similarity ssuv , and attribute similarity s
a
uv . Specifically, s
d
uv is
defined as
sduv =
min{du, dv}
max{du, dv} +
min{wdu, wdv}
max{wdu, wdv} + cos(Du,Dv),
where cos(·, ·) is the cosine similarity between two vectors.
Note that, it is possible thatDu andDv have different lengths.
In that case, we pad the short vector with zeros to ensure that
both have the same length. From the definition, sduv measures
the degree similarity of u and v in G1 and G2, i.e., their local
direct interactivity similarity in ∆1 and ∆2, respectively.
To define ssuv , we need to specify a set of landmark
users from G1 and G2, respectively. Usually, the landmark
users are some pre-de-anonymized users that serve as seeds
for a DA [38][39][40]. There are many techniques to find
landmark users, e.g., clique-based technique [38], community-
based technique [39], and optimization-based technique [40].
In De-Health, we do not require accurate landmark users. In
particular, we select ~ users with the largest degrees from
V1 and V2 as the landmark users, denoted by S1 and S2,
respectively. We also sort the users in S1 and S2 in the degree
decreasing order. Then, we define ssuv as
ssuv = cos(Hu(S1),Hv(S2)) + cos(WHu(S1),WHv(S2)).
Basically, ssuv measures the relative global structural similarity,
i.e., indirect interactivity similarity, of u and v.
For u and v, we define WA(u) ∩ WA(v) =
{(Ai, lu∩v(Ai))|Ai ∈ A(u) ∩ A(v), lu∩v(Ai) =
min{lu(Ai), lv(Ai)}} and WA(u) ∪ WA(v) =
{(Ai, lu∪v(Ai))|Ai ∈ A(u) ∪ A(v), lu∪v(Ai) =
max{lu(Ai), lv(Ai)}}. Further, let | · | be the
cardinality of a set and for the weighted set, we
define |WA(u) ∩ WA(v)| = ∑
Ai∈A(u)∩A(v)
lu∩v(Ai) and
|WA(u) ∪ WA(v)| = ∑
Ai∈A(u)∪A(v)
lu∪v(Ai). Then, sauv is
defined as
sauv =
|A(u) ∩A(v)|
|A(u) ∪A(v)| +
|WA(u) ∩WA(v)|
|WA(u) ∪WA(v)| ,
which measures the attribute similarity (i.e., linguistic similar-
ity) between u and v.
7After specifying sduv , s
s
uv , and s
a
uv , the structural similarity
between u and v is defined as
suv = c1 · sduv + c2 · ssuv + c3 · sauv,
where c1, c2 and c3 are some positive constant values adjusting
the weights of each similarity component.
Top-K Candidate Set. After obtaining the structural sim-
ilarity scores, we compute the Top-K candidate set Cu for
each u ∈ V1 (line 5 in Algorithm 1)3. Here, we propose two
approaches: direct selection and graph matching based selec-
tion. In direct selection, we directly select K auxiliary users
from V2 that have the Top-K similarity scores with u. In graph
matching based selection: Step 1: we first construct a weighted
completely connected bipartite graph G(V1, V2) (anonymized
users on one side while auxiliary users on the other side),
where the weight on each edge is the structural similarity
score between the two corresponding users; Step 2: we find
a maximum weighted bipartite graph matching on G(V1, V2),
denoted by {(ui, vi)|ui ∈ V1, vi, i = 1, 2, · · · , |V1|}; Step 3:
for each (ui, vi) in the matching, we add vi to the Top-K
candidate set of ui and remove the edge between ui and vi
in the bipartite graph G(V1, V2); Step 4: repeat Steps 2 and 3
until we find a Top-K candidate set for each user in V1.
Algorithm 2: Filtering
1 su ← max{suv|u ∈ V1, v ∈ V2};
2 sl ← min{suv|u ∈ V1, v ∈ V2}+ ;
3 construct a threshold vector T =< Ti >, where for
i = 0, 1, · · · , l − 1 >, Ti = su − il−1 · (su − sl);
4 for every u ∈ V1 do
5 for i = 0; i ≤ l − 1; i+ + do
6 C ′u ← Cu;
7 for v ∈ C ′u do
8 if suv < Ti then
9 C ′u = C
′
u \ {v};
10 if C ′u 6= ∅ then
11 Cu ← C ′u, break;
12 if C ′u = ∅ then
13 u→ ⊥, V1 ← V1 \ {u};
Optimization/Filtering. After determining the Top-K candi-
date set for each u ∈ V1, we further optimize Cu using the
filtering procedure shown in Algorithm 2 (to finish line 6 in
Algorithm 1), where  ∈ [0, su − min{suv|u ∈ V1, v ∈ V2}]
is a positive constant value, l is the length of the threshold
vector T (defined later), and C ′u is a temporary candidate
set. The main idea of the filtering process is to pre-eliminate
some less likely candidates in terms of structural similarity
using a threshold vector. Below, we explain Algorithm 2
in detail. First, the threshold interval [sl, su] is specified
3Here, we assume that K is far less than the number of auxiliary users.
Otherwise, it is meaningless to seek Top-K candidate sets.
based on , and the maximum and minimum similarity scores
between the users in V1 and V2 (line 1-2). Then, the threshold
interval is partitioned into l segments with the threshold value
Ti = su − il−1 · (su − sl) (i = 0, 1, · · · , l − 1). We organize
the threshold values as a threshold vector T =< Ti > (line
3). Third, we use T to filter each candidate set Cu starting
from large thresholds to small thresholds (line 5-13). If some
candidate users pass the filtering at some threshold level, we
then break the filtering process and take those candidate users
as the final Cu (line 7-10). If no candidate users are left
even after being filtered by Tl−1 (the smallest threshold), we
conclude that u does not appear in the auxiliary data (i.e.,
u→ ⊥) and remove u from V1 for further consideration (line
12-13).
Note that, the filtering process is mainly used for reducing
the size of the candidate set for each anonymized user, and
thus to help obtain a better refined DA result and accelerate
the DA process in the following stage. In practice, there is
no guarantee for the filtering to improve the DA performance.
Therefore, we set the filtering process as an optional choice
for De-Health.
Refined DA. In the first phase of De-Health, we seek a
Top-K candidate set for each anonymized user. In the second
phase (line 7-9 of Algorithm 1), De-Health conducts refined
DA for each u ∈ V1 and either de-anonymizes u to some
auxiliary user in Cu or concludes that u → ⊥, i.e., u does
not appear in the auxiliary data. To fulfill this task, the high
level idea is: leveraging the stylometric and correlation features
of the users in Cu, train a classifier employing benchmark
machine learning techniques, e.g., Support Vector Machine
(SVM), Nearest Neighbor (NN), Regularized Least Squares
Classification (RLSC), which is similar to that in existing
stylometric approaches [29]-[35]4. Therefore, we do not go to
further details to explain existing benchmark machine learning
techniques.
Nevertheless, there is still an open problem here: by default,
existing benchmark machine learning techniques are satisfiable
at addressing the closed-world DA problem (e.g., [29][31]).
However, their performance is far from expected in open-
world DA [32]. To address this issue, we present two schemes:
false addition and mean-verification, which are motivated
by the open-world author attribution techniques proposed by
Stolerman et al. in [32].
In the false addition scheme, when de-anonymizing u ∈ V1,
we randomly select K ′ users from V2 \Cu (e.g., K ′ = |Cu|),
and add these K ′ users to Cu as false users. Then, if u is de-
anonymized to a false user in Cu, we conclude that u → ⊥,
i.e., u does not appear in the auxiliary data. Otherwise, u is
de-anonymized to a non-false user.
In the mean-verification scheme, we first use the trained
classifier to de-anonymize u to some user, say v, in Cu by
assuming it is a closed-world DA problem. Later, we verify
4In [29]-[35], multiple benchmark machine learning based stylometric
approaches are proposed to address the post/passage-level author attribution.
Although we focus on user-level DA, those approaches could be extended to
our refined DA phase.
8this DA: let λu = (
∑
w∈Cu
suw)/|Cu| be the mean similarity
between u and its candidate users; then, if suv ≥ (1 + r) ·λu,
where r ≥ 0 is some predefined constant value, the DA u→
v is accepted; otherwise, it is rejected, i.e., u → ⊥. Note
that, the verification process can also be implemented using
other techniques, e.g., distractorless verification [45], Sigma
verification [32].
Remark. To the best of knowledge, De-Health is the first
user-level DA attack on online health data. In De-Health, we
propose a novel approach to construct a UDA graph based on
the health data by systematically characterizing the interactiv-
ity correlations among different users as well as the writing
characteristics of users. The UDA graph further enables us to
develop effective graph-based DA techniques, which can be
easily scaled to large-scale data. Moreover, the UDA graph
enables us to extract various structural features, which can be
used to feed benchmark machine learning techniques together
with traditional stylometric features and train more effective
classifiers.
The Top-K DA phase of De-Health can improve the DA
performance from multiple perspectives. On one hand, it
significantly reduces the possible mapping space for each
anonymized user (from V2 to Cu), and thus a more accurate
classifier can be trained to de-anonymize an anonymized user,
followed by the improved DA performance. From the descrip-
tion of De-Health (Algorithm 1), it seems that the Top-K DA
might degrade its DA performance if many true mappings of
the anonymized users cannot be included into their Top-K
candidate sets. However, we seek the candidate set for each
anonymized user u based on structure similarities between u
and the users in V2, and the auxiliary users that have high
structural similarities with u are preferred to be selected as
candidates, e.g., in the direct selection approach. According to
our theoretical analysis in the following section, this candidate
selection approach will not degrade the DA performance in
practice. Furthermore, as shown in our experiments (Section
V), most anonymized users’ true mappings can be selected into
their candidate sets when a proper K is chosen. On the other
hand, since the possible mapping space is significantly reduced
by the Top-K DA, the computational cost for both constructing
the machine learning based classifiers and performing refined
DA can be reduced.
Most real world DA tasks are open-world problems. By in-
troducing the false addition scheme and the mean-verification
scheme, De-Health can address both closed-world and open-
world DA issues.
IV. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we present a general theoretical analysis
framework for the soundness and effectiveness of online health
data DA, which can also serve as the theoretical foundation
of De-Health.
A. Preliminary
For the convenience of analysis, we introduce some formal
notations. We assume ∆1 is an anonymized online health
dataset generated by n1 users denoted by set V1 and ∆2 is
an auxiliary dataset generated by n2 users denoted by set V2.
Note that, it is possible that n1 6= n2. However, since we
employ ∆2 to de-anonymize ∆1, we assume there are some
overlap between users in ∆1 and ∆2. Otherwise, this DA is
meaningless. Let u ∈ ∆1 be an overlapping anonymized user
and u′ ∈ ∆2 be the true mapping of u (u and u′ correspond
to the same real world people).
To de-anonymize ∆1 leveraging ∆2, many features of the
data will be extracted to develop a DA algorithm/model.
The feature here is a general concept, which could include
stylometric features, structural features, social features, and
other possible features in our theoretical analysis. Thus, we
define a general feature space F to characterize all the
possible features, attributes, and other measurements of users.
Then, given a user u, we denote its features by a feature vector
Fu. Based on the features of ∆1 and ∆2, we construct a DA
model/algorithm, denoted by M. For instance, De-Health can
be considered as one implementation ofM: it de-anonymizes
∆1 by employing structural similarity (derived from the de-
fined structural features), stylometric features, and correlation
features. Ideally,M works in the following manner: if u ∈ V1
is an overlapping user, we have M(u, V2) : u → u′, i.e.,
M successfully de-anonymizes u to u′; otherwise, we have
M(u, V2) : u→ ⊥.
To designM, we introduce a general function f(·, ·), which
is defined on the features of two users (e.g., f(Fu,Fv) for
u ∈ V1 and v ∈ V2) and measures the distance of the two
users in terms of their features. Note that, the distance concept
here is very general. It could be defined in terms of differ-
ent metrics, e.g., the distribution similarity or the Euclidian
distance between the feature vectors of two users, depending
on a particular DA algorithm. For instance, when f(·, ·) is
defined using the feature distribution similarity, it can be
defined as a decreasing function with respect to the distribution
similarity, i.e., a higher similarity implies a smaller distance
(f(·, ·) value). Using f(·, ·), mathematically, M can also be
constructed as a function. For instance, we can define M as
M(u ∈ V1, v ∈ V2) = p = f(Fu,Fv)/
∑
x∈V2
f(Fu,Fx)5,
where p ∈ [0, 1] indicates the probability that u is de-
anonymized to v by M.
Let λ be the mean value of correct DAs under f(·, ·), i.e.,
λ = E[f(u, u′)] 6, and λ be mean value of incorrect DAs
under f(·, ·), i.e., λ = E[f(u, v)] where v ∈ V2 and v 6= u′.
Furthermore, assume that f(u, u′) ∈ [θl, θu] and f(u, v) ∈
[θl, θu] (v 6= u′), i.e., the ranges of correct and incorrect DAs
under f are [θl, θu] and [θl, θu], respectively. Let θ = θu− θl,
θ = θu − θl, and δ = max{θ, θ}. Below, we analyze the re-
identifiability, defined as the probability of being successfully
de-anonymized, of ∆1, and further specify the design of a
corresponding M to achieve that re-identifiability.
5Here, an implicated assumption is that f(·, ·) ≥ 0 and ∃x ∈ V2 such
that f(Fu,Fx) 6= 0. Since f(·, ·) is a distance function, this assumption is
intuitively reasonable in practice.
6E[·] denotes the mean/expectation value in this paper.
9Due to the space limitations, we place all the proofs for
theorems and corollaries in Appendix C.
B. Re-Identifiability Analysis
We start the re-identifiablity analysis from the simple case
that: given u ∈ V1 be an overlapping user, u′, v ∈ V2, and
v 6= u′, deriving the re-identifiability of u with respect to
{u′, v}. Let Pr(u {u
′,v}→ u′) be the probability of ∃M such that
M can successfully de-anonymize u to u′ from {u′, v}. Then,
we have the following theorem on quantifying Pr(u
{u′,v}→ u′).
We also specify the design of M in the proof.
Theorem 1. When λ 6= λ, Pr(u {u
′,v}→ u′) ≥ 1 −
2 exp(− (λ−λ)24δ2 ).
In Theorem 1, we derived the probability of successfully
de-anonymizing u from {u′, v} and gave the design of M.
Based on Theorem 1, we can obtain a stronger conclusion
as shown in Corollary 1 using stochastic theory, which states
the asymptotical property of the DA. In the corollary, n is a
positive integer and the same M as specified in Theorem 1 is
employed.
Corollary 1. When λ 6= λ and |λ − λ|/2θ ≥ √2 lnn+ ln 2,
Pr(u
{u′,v}→ u′) n→∞→ 1, i.e., it is asymptotically almost surely
(a.a.s.) that u can be successfully de-anonymized from {u′, v}
7.
In Theorem 1, we studied the re-identifiability of de-
anonymizing u from {u′, v}. In practice, as shown in De-
Health, we need to de-anonymize u from V2, the set of all the
auxiliary users. We give the re-identifiability of u ∈ V1 in this
general case in Corollary 2. Now, suppose that u′ ∈ V2, i.e.,
u is an overlapping user of V1 and V2. We define Pr(u
V2→ u′)
as the probability of ∃M such that M can successfully de-
anonymize u to u′ from V2 (M is specified in the proof).
Corollary 2. When λ 6= λ and |λ−λ|/2θ ≥ √2 lnn+ ln 2n2,
Pr(u
V2→ u′) n→∞→ 1, i.e., it is a.a.s. that u can be successfully
de-anonymized from V2.
Corollary 2 is an even stronger conclusion than that in
Corollary 1. It specifies the conditions to successfully de-
anonymize an anonymized user in general.
Now, we study the re-identifiability of any subset of V1, i.e.,
a subset of anonymized users. Let α ∈ [0, 1] be some constant
value and αn1 be an integer. For ∀Vα ⊆ V1, it is an α-subset
if |Vα| = αn1 and ∀u ∈ Vα, u has a true mapping u′ in V2.
Then, we define that ∆1 is α-re-identifiable if there exists an
α-subset Vα of V1 such that ∀u ∈ Vα, Pr(u V2→ u′) n→∞→
1. We give the probability that ∆1 is α-re-identifiable in the
following theorem.
7Asymptotically almost surely (a.a.s.) implies that as n → ∞, an event
happens with probability goes to 1.
Theorem 2. Suppose that ∆1 has an α-subset Vα. Then, when
λ 6= λ, Pr(∆1 is α-re-identifiable) ≥ 1 − exp(ln 2αn1n2 −
(λ−λ)2
4θ2 ).
In Theorem 2, we derived the probability that ∆1 is α-
re-identifiable. Similar to that in Corollary 2, we now derive
the conditions to have ∆1 stochastically α-re-identifiable. We
show the result in Corollary 3. In the proof, we use the same
M design as that in Theorem 2.
Corollary 3. Suppose that ∆1 has an α-subset Vα. Then,
when λ 6= λ and |λ − λ|/2θ ≥ √2 lnn+ ln 2αn1n2, Pr(∆1
is α-re-identifiable) n→∞→ 1, i.e., it is a.a.s. that ∆1 is α-re-
identifiable.
In Theorem 2 and Corollary 3, we derived the probability
to have ∆1 α-re-identifiable as well as the conditions for ∆1
to be α-re-identifiable. Since α ∈ [0, 1], those results provide
the theoretical analysis for general online health data DA.
C. Top-K Re-Identifiability Analysis
In the previous subsection, we analyzed the probability
of de-anonymizing one user or a group of users. We also
derived the conditions to have one or a group of users to
be a.a.s. re-identifiable. In the DA research, in addition to
accurate DA, we may also have interest in understanding the
probability/conditions for conducting Top-K DA. Thus, we
give the Top-K re-identifiability analysis in this subsection.
Formally, for u ∈ V1, suppose it has a true mapping u′ ∈ V2.
Then, a correct Top-K DA of u is to seek a candidate set Cu
for u such that Cu ⊆ V2, |Cu| = K (in this paper, it is also
acceptable if |Cu| < K), and u′ ∈ Cu. Let Pr(u → Cu) be
the probability of that ∃M and M can find a correct Top-K
candidate set Cu for u. We show the Top-K re-identifiability
of one user and the conditions to have it asymptotically Top-K
re-identifiable in the following theorem.
Theorem 3. When λ 6= λ, (i) Pr(u → Cu) ≥
1 − exp(ln 2(n2 − K) − (λ−λ)
2
4δ2 ); (ii) if |λ − λ|/2θ ≥√
ln 2(n2 −K) + 2 lnn, Pr(u→ Cu) n→∞→ 1, i.e., it is a.a.s.
that u is Top-K re-identifiable.
In Theorem 3, we derived the Top-K re-identifiability of
a user and the conditions to asymptotically de-anonymize the
user. Now, we extend our analysis to a general scenario of Top-
K DA of a set of anonymized users. Let Vα be an α-subset of
∆1. Then, we define ∆1 to be Top-K α-re-identifiable if ∀u ∈
Vα, ∃M andM can find a correct Top-K candidate set Cu for
u. Let Pr(Vα : u→ Cu) be the probability that ∆1 is Top-K
α-re-identifiable. Then, we show the Top-K re-identifiability
of Vα and the conditions to have it asymptotically Top-K re-
identifiable in the following theorem.
Theorem 4. When λ 6= λ, (i) Pr(Vα : u → Cu) ≥
1 − exp(ln 2αn1(n2 − K) − (λ−λ)
2
4δ2 ); (ii) if |λ − λ|/2θ ≥√
ln 2αn1(n2 −K) + 2 lnn, Pr(Vα : u → Cu) n→∞→ 1, i.e.,
it is a.a.s. that ∆1 is Top-K α-re-identifiable.
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V. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we experimentally evaluate De-Health lever-
aging the two collected online health datasets: WebMD and
HB. First, we evaluate De-Health’s performance in the closed-
world DA setting, i.e., for each anonymized user, its true
mapping is in the auxiliary data (training data). Then, we
extend our evaluation to the more practical open-world DA
setting: for each anonymized user, its true mapping may or
may not appear in the auxiliary data.
A. Closed-world DA
1) Top-K DA.: First, we evaluate the Top-K DA perfor-
mance of De-Health. In the Top-K DA phase, we seek a
candidate set Cu ⊆ V2 for each anonymized user u. We
define that the Top-K DA of u is successful/correct if u’s
true mapping is included in the Cu returned by De-Health.
Note that, the Top-K DA is crucial to the success and overall
performance of De-Health: given a relatively large auxiliary
dataset and a small K, if there is a high success rate in this
phase, the candidate space of finding the true mapping of
an anonymized user can be significantly reduced (e.g., from
millions or hundreds of thousands of candidates to several
hundreds of candidates). Then, many benchmark machine
learning techniques can be employed to conduct the second
phase refined (precise) DA, since as shown in [29]-[35],
benchmark machine learning techniques can achieve much
better performance on a relatively small training dataset than
on a large training dataset8.
Methodology and Setting. We partition each user’s data
(posts) in WebMD and HB into two parts: auxiliary data
denoted by ∆2 and anonymized data denoted by ∆1. Specifi-
cally, we consider three scenarios: randomly taking 50%, 70%,
and 90% of each user’s data as auxiliary data and the rest
as anonymized data (by replacing each username with some
random ID), respectively. Then, we run De-Health to identify
a Top-K candidate set for each user in ∆1 and examine the
CDF of the successful Top-K DA with respect to the increase
of K. For the parameters in De-Health, the default settings
are: c1 = 0.05, c2 = 0.05, and c3 = 0.9. We assign low
weights to degree and distance similarities when computing
the structural similarity. This is because, as shown in Section
II, even in the UDA graph constructed based on the whole
WebMD/HB dataset, (i) the degree of most of the users
is low; and (ii) the size of most identified communities is
small and the UDA graph is disconnected (consisting of tens
of disconnected components). After partitioning the original
dataset into auxiliary and anonymized data, the degree of
most users gets lower and the connectivity of the UDA
graph decreases further, especially in the scenario of 10%-
anonymized data (the anonymized UDA graph consists of
hundreds of disconnected components in our experiments).
Thus, intuitively, the degree and distance (vector) do not
8In the closed-world author attribution setting, state-of-the-art machine
learning based stylometric approaches can achieve ∼ 80% accuracy on 100-
level of users [29], ∼ 30% accuracy on 10K-level of users [30], and ∼ 20%
accuracy on 100K-level of users [31].
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Fig. 3. CDF of correct Top-K DA.
provide much useful information in distinguishing different
users for the two leveraged datasets here, and we assign low
weights to degree and distance similarities. Furthermore, we
set the number of landmark users as ~ = 50 (the Top-50 users
with respect to degree). For the structural similarity based
Top-K candidate selection, we employ the direct selection
approach. Since we conduct closed-world evaluation in this
subsection, the filtering process is omitted. All the experiments
are run 10 times. The results are the average of those 10 runs.
Results. We show the CDF of successful Top-K DA with
respect to different K ranges (K ∈ [1, 50], K ∈ [1, 100], K ∈
[1, 500], and K ∈ [1, 1000]) in Fig.3. We have the following
observations.
First, with the increasing of K, the CDF of successful Top-
K DA increases. The reason is evident. When K increases, the
probability of including the true mapping of an anonymized
user to its Top-K candidate set also increases.
Second, when comparing the Top-K DA performance of
De-Health on WebMD and HB, De-Health has a better per-
formance on WebMD than that on HB. For instance, when
de-anonymizing the two datasets in the 70%-auxiliary data
scenario, De-Health finds the correct Top-500 candidate sets
for 96% WebMD users while finds the correct Top-500 can-
didate sets for 64.7% HB users. This is due to the fact that
the HB dataset (388,398 users) has many more users than
the WebMD dataset (89,393 users), and thus with a higher
probability, the correct Top-K candidate set can be found for
a WebMD user under the same experimental setting.
Third, the size of the available dataset (either the auxiliary
data or the anonymized data) is important to constructing the
UDA graph and thus has an explicit impact on the Top-K DA
performance. For instance, when de-anonymizing WebMD,
De-Health can find the correct Top-500 candidate sets for
100% anonymized users in the 50%-auxiliary data scenario
while can find the correct Top-500 candidate sets for 43.5%
anonymized users in the 90%-auxiliary data scenario. This is
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because in the 90%-auxiliary data scenario, only 10% of the
original dataset severs as the anonymized data. Then, only a
very sparse anonymized UDA graph that consists of hundreds
of disconnected components can be constructed. Thus, the
Top-K DA performance has been clearly degraded.
Overall, De-Health is powerful in conducting Top-K DA on
large-scale datasets (especially, when sufficient data appear in
the auxiliary/anonymized data). By seeking each anonymized
user Top-K candidate set, it decreases the DA space for
a user from 100K-level to 100-level with high accuracy.
This is further very meaningful for the following up refined
DA, which enables the development of an effective machine
learning based classifier.
2) Refined DA: We have demonstrated the effectiveness of
the Top-K DA of De-Health on large-scale datasets. Now, we
evaluate the refined DA phase of De-Health. As we indicated
in Section III, the refined DA can be implemented by training
a classifier employing existing benchmark machine learning
techniques similar to those in [29]-[35]. In addition, more than
96.6% (resp., 98.2%) WebMD users and more than 92.2%
(resp., 95.6%) HB users have less than 20 (resp., 40) posts, and
the average length of those posts is short (the average lengths
for WebMD posts and HB posts are 127.59 words and 147.24
words, respectively). Therefore, to enable the application of
machine learning techniques to train a meaningful classifier9,
we conduct this group of evaluation on small-scale datasets
extracted from the WebMD dataset, which is actually sufficient
to show the performance of De-Health.
Methodology and Settings. We construct the auxiliary
(training) and anonymized (testing) data for two evaluation
settings. In the first setting, we randomly select 50 users each
with 20 posts. Then, for the posts of each user, we take 10
for training (auxiliary data) and the other 10 (anonymized) for
testing. In the second setting, we randomly select 50 users
each with 40 posts. Then, we take 20 posts from each user
for training (auxiliary data) and take the remaining data for
testing (anonymized). For each setting, we conduct 10 groups
of evaluations. The reported results are the average of those
10 evaluations.
For the parameters in De-Health, the default settings are:
c1 = 0.05, c2 = 0.05, c3 = 0.9 (the reason is the
same as before), ~ = 5,  = 0.01, and l = 10; the
employed Top-K candidate set selection approach is direct
selection. In the refined DA phase, the employed machine
learning techniques for training the classifier are the k-Nearest
Neighbors (KNN) algorithm [31] and the Sequential Minimal
Optimization (SMO) Support Vector Machine [32]. Note that,
our settings and evaluations can be extended to other machine
learning techniques directly. The features used to train the
classifier are the stylometric features and structural features
extracted from the auxiliary data (as defined in Section II).
9As indicated in [29][31][33][35], when applying machine learning based
stylometric approaches for author attribution, there is a minimum requirement
on the number of training words, e.g., 4500 words and 7500 words, for
obtaining a meaningful classifier.
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Fig. 4. DA accuracy (closed-world).
We also compare De-Health with a DA method that is
similar to traditional stylometric approaches [29]-[37]: lever-
aging the same feature set as in De-Health, training a classifier
using KNN and SMO without of our Top-K DA phase, and
employing the classifier for DA. We denote this comparison
method as Stylometry (although we included correlation fea-
tures in addition to stylometric features). Actually, Stylometry
is equivalent to the second phase (refined DA) of De-Health.
Results. Let Y be the number of anonymized users that have
true mappings in ∆2 and Yc be the number of anonymized
users that have true mappings in ∆2 and are successfully
de-anonymized by algorithm A. Then, the accuracy of A is
defined as Yc/Y .
We demonstrate the DA accuracy of De-Health and Stylom-
etry in Fig.4, where K = 5, 10, 15, 50 indicate the setting of
Top-K DA in De-Health, and ‘-10’ (e.g., SMO-10) and ‘-20’
(e.g., SMO-20) represent the evaluation settings with 10 and
20 posts of each user for training/testing, respectively. From
the results, SMO has a better performance than KNN with
respect to de-anonymizing the employed WebMD datasets.
De-Health significantly outperforms Stylometry, e.g., in the
setting of SMO-20, De-Health (K = 5) successfully de-
anonyimzes 70% users (with accuracy of 70%) while Sty-
lometry only successfully de-anonymizes 8% users: (i) for
Stylometry, given 20 (resp., 10) posts and the average length
of WebMD posts is 127.59, the training data is 2551.8 (resp.,
1275.9) words on average, which might be insufficient for
training an effective classifier to de-anonymize an anonymized
user; and (ii) as expected, this demonstrates that De-Health’s
Top-K DA phase is very effective, which can clearly reduce
the DA space (from 50 to 5) with a satisfying successful
Top-K DA rate (consistent with the results in the Top-K DA
evaluation).
Interestingly, De-Health has better accuracy for a smaller
K than for a larger K. Although a large K implies a high
successful Top-K DA rate, it cannot guarantee a better refined
(precise) DA accuracy in the second phase, especially when
the training data for the second phase (same to Stylometry) are
insufficient. On the other hand, a smaller K is more likely to
induce a better DA performance since it reduces more of the
possible DA space. Therefore, when less data are available
for training, the Top-K DA phase is more likely to dominate
the overall DA performance.
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Fig. 5. CDF of correct Top-K DA (open-world).
B. Open-world DA
Now, we evaluate De-Health in a more challenging setting
where the anonymized user may or may not have a true
mapping in the auxiliary data, i.e., open-world DA.
1) Top-K DA: We start the open-world evaluation from
examining the effectiveness of the Top-K DA of De-Health.
Methodology and Settings. Leveraging the WebMD and
HB datasets, we construct three open-world DA scenarios
under which the anonymized data and the auxiliary data have
the same number of users and their overlapping user ratios
are 50%, 70%, and 90%, respectively10. Then, we employ
De-Health to examine the Top-K DA performance in each
scenario with the default setting: for each overlapping user,
take half of its data (posts) for training and the other half
for testing; c1 = 0.05, c2 = 0.05, and c3 = 0.9 (for
the same reason as explained before); ~ = 50; and for the
Top-K candidate approach, employ direct selection. All the
evaluations are repeated 10 times. The results are the average
of those 10 runs.
Results. We show the Top-K DA performance given dif-
ferent K ranges (K ∈ [1, 50], K ∈ [1, 100], K ∈ [1, 500], and
K ∈ [1, 1000]) in Fig.5. First, similar to that in the closed-
world setting, the CDF of successful Top-K DA increases
with the increasing of K since the true mapping of an
anonymized user (if it has) is more likely to be included in
its Top-K candidate set for a large K. Second, De-Health
has a better Top-K DA performance when more users are
shared between the anonymized data (graph) and the auxiliary
data (graph). For instance, when de-anonyming WebMD, the
successful Top-500 DA rate is 58.4% when the overlapping
user ratio is 70%, while 74.2% when the overlapping user
10Let n be the number of users in WebMD/HB, and x and y be the number
of overlapping and non-overlapping users in the auxiliary/anonymized dataset.
Then, it is straightforward to determine x and y by solving the equations:
x+ 2y = n and x
x+y
= 50% (resp., 70% and 90%).
ratio is 90%. This is because a higher overlapping user ratio
implies more common users between the anonymized and
auxiliary data, followed by higher structural similarity between
the anonymized and auxiliary UDA graphs. Thus, De-Health
can find the correct Top-K candidate sets for more users
(which are determined by the users’ structural similarities).
Third, when comparing closed-world (Fig.3) and open-world
(Fig.5) Top-K DA, better performance can be achieved in the
closed-world setting. The reason is the same as our analysis
for the second observation. Finally, under the open-world
setting, De-Health can still achieve a satisfying Top-K DA
performance (compared to the closed-world setting, a larger
K, e.g., K = 1500, might be necessary), and thus significantly
reduces the possible DA space for an anonymized user.
2) Refined DA: Following the Top-K DA, we evaluate
the refined DA performance of De-Health in the open-world
setting. Due to the same reason as analyzed before, we conduct
this group of evaluations on small WebMD datasets, which is
again sufficient to show the performance of De-Health.
Methodology and Settings. We construct an anonymized
dataset and an auxiliary dataset such that (i) each dataset has
100 users and each user has 40 posts; (ii) the overlapping
user ratio between the two datasets is 50%; and (iii) for each
overlapping user, half of its posts appear in the anonymized
data while the others appear in the auxiliary data. Taking the
same approach, we construct two other pairs of anonymized
datasets and auxiliary datasets except for with overlapping user
ratios of 70% and 90%, respectively.
For De-Health, its default settings are: c1 = 0.05, c2 = 0.05,
and c3 = 0.9; ~ = 5;  = 0.01 and l = 10 for filtering; the
Top-K candidate selection approach is direct selection; the
leveraged features are the stylometric and structural features
defined in Section II and the employed machine learning
techniques are KNN and SMO; and after classification, we
apply for the mean-verification scheme with r = 0.25. We also
compare De-Health with Stylometry (which can be considered
as equivalent to the second phase of De-Health). All the
experiments are run 10 times and the results are the average
of those 10 runs.
Results. We report the DA accuracy and False Positive
(FP) rate in Fig.6, where 50%, 70%, and 90% indicate the
overlapping user ratios. First, in the open-world setting, De-
Health again significantly outperforms Stylometry with respect
to both DA accuracy and the FP rate. For instance, in the
setting of 50%-SMO, The DA accuracy of De-Health (K = 5)
is 68% and of Stylometry is 10%, respectively; and meanwhile,
the FP rate of De-Health (K = 5) is 4% and of Stylometry
is 52%, respectively. For Stylometry, insufficient training data
is one reason for its poor performance. In addition, in the
open-world DA setting, non-overlapping users, which can
be considered as noise, further degrade its performance. On
the other hand, for De-Health, there are also two reasons
responsible for its better performance: (i) the Top-K DA
reduces the possible DA space while preserving a relatively
high success rate, and thus high DA accuracy is achieved;
and (ii) the mean-verification scheme eliminates FP DAs
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Fig. 6. DA accuracy and FP rate (open-world).
and thus reduces the FP rate. Second, similar to the closed-
world scenario, De-Health with a smaller K has better DA
accuracy (not necessary the FP rate) than that with a larger
K. The reason is the same as discussed before: when less
data are available for training in the second phase, the Top-K
DA is more likely to dominate the overall DA performance
of De-Health. From the figure, we also observe that SMO-
trained classifier induces better performance than KNN-trained
classifier in most cases.
VI. REAL IDENTITY IDENTIFICATION
Leveraging De-Health, an adversary can now have the
medical/health information of online health services users,
e.g., users of WebMD and HB. On top of the DA results of
De-Health, we present a linkage attack framework to link those
medical/health information of the service users to real world
people in this section.
A. Linkage Attack Framework
In the designed linkage attack framework, we mainly con-
duct username-based linkage and avatar-based linkage.
Username-based Linkage. For most online health services,
the users’ usernames are publicly available. In addition to that,
there are many other social attributes that might be publicly
available, e.g., gender, join date, and location of users are
available on HB. In [48], Perito et al. empirically demonstrated
that Internet users tend to choose a small number of correlated
usernames and use them across many online services. They
also developed a model to characterize the entropy of a given
Internet username and demonstrated that a username with high
(resp., low) entropy is very unlikely (resp., likely) picked by
multiple users. Motivated by this fact, we implement a tool,
named NameLink, to semi-automatically connect usernames
on one online health service and other Internet services, e.g.,
Twitter.
NameLink works in the following manner: (i) collect the
usernames of the users of an online health service; (ii)
compute the entropy of the usernames using the technique
in [48] and sort them in the entropy decreasing order; (iii)
perform general and/or targeting online search using the sorted
usernames (leveraging Selenium, which automates browsers
and imitates user’s mouse click, drag, scroll and many other
input events). For general online searches, NameLink searches
a username with/without other attributes (e.g., location) di-
rectly, e.g., “jwolf6589 + California”; for targeted searches,
in addition to terms used in general search, NameLink adds a
targeting Internet service, e.g., “jwolf6589 + Twitter”; and (iv)
after obtaining the search results, NameLink filters unrelated
results based on predefined heuristics. The main functional-
ities of NameLink include: (i) information aggregation; For
instance, there is not too much information associated with
WebMD users. However, there is rich information associated
with HB users (e.g., location) and BoneSmart users (e.g.,
ages) [52]. By linking the users on those three services, we
may obtain richer information of WebMD users; (ii) real
people linkage; For instance, for the WebMD users that have
high entropy, e.g., “jwolf6589”, we may try to link them to
social network services, e.g., Twitter, and thus reveal their true
identities; and (iii) cross-validation. For each user, we may
link her to a real world person using multiple techniques, e.g.,
the username-based linkage and the following avatar-based
linkage. Therefore, using the linkage results from different
techniques can further enrich the obtained information as well
as cross-validate the search results, and thus improve the
linkage accuracy.
Avatar-based Linkage. Many online health services, e.g.,
WebMD, allow users to choose their own avatars. Thus,
many users take this option by uploading an avatar with-
out awareness of the privacy implications of their actions.
However, as shown in [49], those photos may also cause
serious privacy leakage. The reason behind is that a significant
amount of users upload the same photo/avatar across different
Internet services (websites). Similar to NameLink, we develop
another semi-automatic tool, named AvatarLink, to link the
users of one online health service to other Internet services,
e.g., Facebook, Twitter. AvatarLink generally follows the same
working procedure as NameLink except for the search engine,
which takes either an image URL or user uploaded image
file as a search key. AvatarLink can also fulfill the same
functionalities as NameLink, i.e., information aggregation, real
people linkage, and cross-validation.
14
B. Evaluation
We validate the linkage attack framework using the collected
WebMD dataset since all its users have publicly available
usernames and many of them have publicly available avatars.
Note that, the employed WebMD dataset is collected from a
real world online health service (and thus generated by real
people). Therefore, it might be illegal, at least improper, to
employ NameLink and AvatarLink to conduct a large-scale
linkage attack although we can do that. When linking the
medical/health information to real world people, we only show
a proof-of-concept attack and results.
Objectives and Settings. Considering that there is not too
much information associated with WebMD users, we have two
objectives for our evaluation: (i) information aggregation, i.e.,
enrich the information of WebMD users; and (ii) link WebMD
users to real world people, reveal their identities, and thus
compromise their medical/health privacy.
To achieve the first objective, we employ NameLink for
targeting linkage and the targeting service is HB, which has
rich user information. Since we have both a WebMD dataset
and a HB dataset, we limit our linkage to the users within the
available datasets and thus we can do the linkage offline. Note
that, this is a proof-of-concept attack and it can be extended
to large-scale directly.
To achieve the second objective, we employ AvatarLink
to link WebMD users to some well known social network
services, e.g., Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn. There are
89,393 users in the WebMD dataset, which are too many
for a proof-of-concept linkage attack. Thus, we filter avatars
(i.e., users) according to four conditions: (i) exclude default
avatars; (ii) exclude avatars depicting non-human objects, such
as animals, natural scenes, and logos; (iii) exclude avatars
depicting fictitious persons; and (iv) exclude avatars with only
kids in the picture. Consequently, we have 2805 avatars left.
When using AvatarLink to perform the linkage attack, the
employed search engine is Google Reverse Image Search. In
order to avoid the violation of Google’s privacy and security
policies, we spread the searching task of the 2805 avatars in
five days (561 avatars/day, on average) and the time interval
between two continuous searches is at least 1 minute.
Results and Findings. For understanding and analyzing the
results returned by NameLink and AvatarLink, a challenging
task is to validate their accuracy. To guarantee the preciseness
as much as possible, we manually validate all the results
and only preserve the ones with high confidence. Specifically,
for the results returned by NameLink, in addition to using
the technique in [48] to filter out results with low entropy
usernames, we manually compare the users’ posts on two
websites with respect to writing style and semantics, as well as
the users’ activity pattern, e.g., post written time. Interestingly,
many linked users post the same description of their medical
conditions on both websites to seek suggestions. For the results
returned by AvatarLink, we manually compare the person in
the avatar and the person in the found picture, and only results
in which we are confident are preserved.
Finally, using NameLink, we successfully link 1676
WebMD users to HB users and thus, those users’ medical
records and other associated information can be combined to
provide us (or adversaries) more complete knowledge about
them. Using AvatarLink, we successfully link 347 WebMD
users to real world people through well known social network
services (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, and Google+),
which consists 12.4% of the 2805 target users. Among the 347
WebMD users, more than 33.4% can be linked to two or more
social network services, and leveraging the Whitepage service
[50], detailed social profiles of most users can be obtained.
More interestingly, the WebMD users linked to HB and the
WebMD users linked to real people have 137 overlapping
users. This implies that information aggregation and linkage
attacks are powerful in compromising online health service
users’ privacy. Overall, we can acquire most of the 347
users’ full name, medical/health information, birthdate, phone
numbers, addresses, jobs, relatives, friends, co-workers, etc.
Thus, those users’ privacy suffers from a serious threat. For
example, after observing the medical/health records of some
users, we can find their sexual orientation, relationships, and
related infectious diseases. More concerning, some of the users
even have serious mental/psychological problems and show
suicidal tendency.
VII. DISCUSSION
De-Health: Novelty versus Limitation. As shown in the
experiments (Section V), the Top-K DA of De-Health is ef-
fective in reducing the DA space (from 100K-order of possible
space to 100-order of possible space) while preserving a sat-
isfying precision (having the true mapping of an anonymized
user included into the candidate set). Further, when the training
data for constructing a powerful classifier are insufficient,
such DA space reduction is more helpful for De-Health to
achieve a promising DA accuracy. Therefore, the Top-K DA
is stable and robust. For the refined DA phase, technically, it
can be implemented by existing benchmark machine learning
techniques. Nevertheless, due to the benefit of the Top-K DA
phase, the possible DA space is reduced by several orders of
magnitude, which enables us to build an effective classifier
even with insufficient training data. Therefore, the Top-K DA
together with the refined DA lead to promising performance
of De-Health in both closed-world and open-world scenarios.
It is important to note that we do not apply advanced
anonymization techniques to the health data when evaluating
the performance of De-Health. This is mainly because no
feasible or dedicated anonymization technique is available for
large-scale online health data, to the best of our knowledge.
Actually, developing proper anonymization techniques for
large-scale online health data is a challenging open problem.
The challenges come from (i) the data volume is very big,
e.g., WebMD has millions of users that generate millions to
billions of health/medical posts every month; (ii) unlike well-
structured traditional medical records, the online health data
are generated by millions of different users. It is a challeng-
ing task to organize those unstructured (complex) data; and
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(iii) different from other kinds of data, health/medical data
have sensitive and important information. A proper health
data anonymization scheme should appropriately preserve the
data’s utility (e.g., preserve the accurate description of a
disease). We take developing effective online health data
anonymization techniques as a future work.
Re-identifiability Analysis: Generic versus Loose. In our
theoretical analysis of online health data DA, we quantify the
impacts of different data features, including local interactivity
features, global interactivity features, associated attributes, and
stylometric features, on the anonymity of the data. We also
derive the conditions and probabilities for successfully de-
anonymizing one user or a group of users in both Top-K and
accurate DA. However, to guarantee the maximum generality,
we do not specify the exact distribution of considered features.
In reality, it is possible to obtain tighter conditions and prob-
ability bounds when specifying the distributions of features
(evidently, this is at the cost of sacrificing the generality of
the theoretical analysis), e.g., assuming the local interactivity
features follow a Poisson distribution. Therefore, studying the
characteristics of different features and deriving the analysis
under some specific distribution will be another future work.
Online Health Data Privacy and Policies. Based on our
analysis and experimental results (especially the results of
the linkage attack), online health data privacy suffers from
serious threats. Unfortunately, there is no effective solution
for protecting the privacy of online health service users from
either the technical perspective or the policy perspective.
Therefore, our results in this paper are expected to shed
light in two areas: (i) for our De-Health and linkage attack
frameworks and evaluation results, they are expected to show
users, data owners, researchers, and policy makers the concrete
attacks and the corresponding serious privacy leakage; and
(ii) for our theoretical analysis, it is expected to provide
researchers and policy makers a clear understanding of the
impacts that different features have on the data anonymity, and
thus help facilitate them to develop effective online health data
anonymization techniques and proper privacy policies.
VIII. RELATED WORK
Hospital/Structured Data Anonymization and DA. To
anonymize the claims data used in the Heritage Health Prize
(HHP) competition and ensure that they meet the HIPAA
Privacy Rule, Emam proposed several anonymization methods
based on a risk threshold [18]. Fernandes et al. developed
an anonymous psychiatric case register, the Clinical Record
Interactive Search (CRIS), based on the EHRs generated from
the South London and Maudsley NHS Trust (SLaM) [19]. For
the scenario of statistical health information release, Gardner
et al. developed SHARE, which can release the information
in a differentially private manner [20]. To defend against
the re-assembly attack, Sharma et al. proposed DAPriv, an
encryption-based decentralized architecture for protecting the
privacy of medical data [21]. In [22], Emam et al. system-
atically evaluated existing DA attacks to structured health
data. A comprehensive survey on existing privacy-preserving
structured health data publishing techniques (45+) was given
by Gkoulalas-Divanis et al. in [23].
Online Health Data. In [13], Nie et al. sought to bridge the
vocabulary gap between health seekers and online healthcare
knowledge. Another similar effort is [14], where Luo and Tang
developed iMed, an intelligent medical Web search engine.
Along the line of analyzing users’ behavior in searching, Car-
tright et al. studied the intentions and attention in exploratory
health search [15] and White and Horvitz studied the onset
and persistence of medical concerns in search logs [16]. Nie
et al. studied automatic disease inference in [17].
Health Data Policy. In [24], Barth-Jones re-examined the
‘re-identification’ attack of Governor William Weld’s medical
information. In [25], Sen¯or et al. conducted a review of
free web-accessible Personal Health Record (PHR) privacy
policies. In [26], McGraw summarized concerns with the
anonymization standard and methodologies under the HIPAA
regulations. In [27], Hripcsak et al. summarized the ongoing
gaps and challenges of health data use, stewardship, and
governance, along with policy suggestions. In [28], Emam et
al. analyzed the key concepts and principles when anonymiz-
ing health data while ensuring it preserves the utility for
meaningful analysis.
Stylometric Approaches. Stylometric techniques have been
widely used for compromising the anonymity of online users.
In [29], Abbasi and Chen proposed the use of stylometric
analysis techniques to identify authors based on writing style.
In [30], Koppel et al. studied the authorship attribution prob-
lem in the wild. Later, in [31], Narayanan et al. studied the
feasibility of Internet-scale author identification. Considering
that the closed-world setting does not hold in many real
world applications, Stolerman et al. presented a Classify-
Verify framework for open-world author identification, which
performs better in adversarial settings than traditional author
classification. In [33], Afroz et al. studied the performance
of stylometric techniques when faced with authors who inten-
tionally obfuscate their writing style or attempt to imitate that
of other authors. In [34], Afroz et al. investigated stylometry-
based adapting authorship attribution to underground forums
and proposed a general multiple author detection algorithm.
Another scenario of applying stylometric techniques is [35],
where Caliskan-Islam et al.de-anonymized programmers via
code stylometry. To defend against stylometry-based author
attribution, McDonald et al. presented Anonymouth [36].
In [37], Brennan et al. proposed a framework for creating
adversarial passages, which includes obfuscation, imitation,
and translation techniques.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study the privacy of online health data.
Our main conclusions are four-fold. First, we present a novel
two-phase online health data DA attack, named De-Health,
which can be applied to both closed-world and open-world
DA settings. Second, we conduct the first theoretical analysis
on the soundness and effectiveness of online health data DA.
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Our analysis explicitly shows the conditions and probabili-
ties of successfully de-anonymizing one user or a group of
users in both exact DA and Top-K DA. Third, leveraging
two large real world online health datasets, we validate the
performance of De-Health. De-Health can significantly reduce
the DA space while preserving high accuracy. Even in the
scenario where training data are insufficient, De-Health still
achieves promising DA accuracy. Finally, we present a linkage
attack framework that can link online health data to real
world people and thus clearly demonstrate the vulnerability
of existing online health data. Our findings have meaningful
implications to researchers and policy makers in helping them
understand the privacy vulnerability of online health data and
develop effective anonymization techniques and proper privacy
policies.
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APPENDIX
A. Example Posts from WebMD and HB
Below are example posts from WebMD and HB, respec-
tively.
WebMD User ***: Hi I have hep c genotype 3b I
guess it’s a rare strain I’m 29 my viral load has gone
from 10thousand to 3 million in 5 months and it’s
jumped to 8 million in the last month what’s going
on? I’m in the process of screening for treatment but
going up 5millions in one month? Is that possible I
am extremely extremely I’ll. I’m also battling with
tapering off of ativan and methadone my doctor says
that these meds don’t activate hep c or aggravate
I mean. My alt is like 400 and last like 200 has
anyone experience this? I’m in severe withdrawal
even not tapering just holding on my meds but I’m
so sick and scared I’ve tried to detox off my meds
so many times that I have what is called kindling.
My nervous system is completely destabilized and I
have psychotic trauma symptoms from the repeated
attempts it’s going to take years to taper off my meds
but can someone give me the lower down on all this
hep c and viral load stuff my doctors are blown away
how fast it is progressing
HB User ***: hello everyone, I hope I am posting
in the right place I have been sexually active for
2 and a half years, and only had 2 partners. I am
now with my boyfriend for two years. I was in
Germany for one month and a half, and when I
came back we had unprotected sex 2 days in a row.
That week I started to have some abdominal pain
when I peed. It felt like my left side was being
crushed. A few days after that, when I went to pee,
the whole area, both left and right side hurt, and
the pain kept being there for another 10-15 minutes.
Anyway, I went and got tests done, I have someone
who works in a lab and I got all the tests done,
and I was diagnosed with mycoplasma huminis and
ureaplasma urealyticum infections, having to take
doxicilin, suppositories and ovules(?) (sorry, English
is not my first language). Now my dilemma is
this: I have been told it is an STD. How can it
be an STD when I was my boyfriend’s first and
we’ve been together for 2 years without any kind of
these problems and have had unprotected sex before?
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Fig. 7. User degree distribution.
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Fig. 8. WebMD graph community structure.
What are the causes of this? I’m really confused and
don’t know what to think.
B. Degree Distribution and Community Structure of the Cor-
relation Graph
We demonstrate the degree distributions of the WebMD
graph and the HB graph in Fig.7. Basically, the degree of
most of the users in the two datasets are low. Employing
the WebMD graph as an example, we show its community
structure under different settings in Fig.8 (depicted using the
tool in [51]), where (a) shows the community structure of
the original WebMD graph, and (b), (c), and (d) show the
community structures of the WebMD graph by omitting the
users with degree less than 11, 21, and 31, respectively.
In each scenario, the graph is not connected (consisting of
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several components) and about 10 – 100 communities can be
identified, which implies that the graph’s connectivity is not
strong.
C. Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. Let X = λ+λ2 . We prove this theorem
by considering the following two cases. When λ < λ, we have
Pr(f(u, u′) ≥ f(u, v)) ≤ Pr(f(u, u′) ≥ X) + Pr(f(u, v) ≤
X) = Pr(f(u, u′) ≥ λ+λ2 ) + Pr(f(u, v) ≤ λ+λ2 ). Let
ε1 =
λ−λ
2λ and ε2 =
λ−λ
2λ
. We have Pr(f(u, u′) ≥ f(u, v)) ≤
Pr(f(u, u′) ≥ (1 + ε1)λ) + Pr(f(u, v) ≤ (1 − ε2)λ).
Applying the generalized Chernoff bound [46], we have
Pr(f(u, u′) ≥ f(u, v)) ≤ exp(− 2ε21λ2θ2 ) + exp(− ε
2
2λ
2
θ
2 ) =
exp(− 2λ2θ2 (λ−λ)
2
4λ2 ) + exp(−λ
2
θ
2
(λ−λ)2
4λ
2 ) = exp(− (λ−λ)
2
2θ2 ) +
exp(− (λ−λ)2
4θ
2 ) ≤ exp(− (λ−λ)
2
4θ2 ) + exp(− (λ−λ)
2
4θ
2 ) ≤
2 exp(− (λ−λ)24δ2 ). Then, we design a M under which u →
arg min
x∈{u′,v}
f(u, x), i.e., u is de-anonymized to the one in
{u′, v} who generates the smallest f(u, ·) value. Then, accord-
ing to our above analysis, we have Pr(f(u, u′) ≥ f(u, v)) ≤
2 exp(− (λ−λ)24δ2 ), which implies Pr(f(u, u′) < f(u, v)) ≥ 1−
2 exp(− (λ−λ)24δ2 ), i.e., Pr(u
{u′,v}→ u′) ≥ 1− 2 exp(− (λ−λ)24δ2 ).
Now, we consider the second case that λ > λ. Let ε1 = λ−λ2λ
and ε2 = λ−λ2λ . Then, applying the generalized Chernoff
bound, we have Pr(f(u, u′) ≤ f(u, v)) ≤ Pr(f(u, u′) ≤
X)+Pr(f(u, v) ≥ X) = Pr(f(u, u′) ≤ λ+λ2 )+Pr(f(u, v) ≥
λ+λ
2 ) = Pr(f(u, u
′) ≤ (1 − ε1)λ) + Pr(f(u, v) ≥ (1 +
ε2)λ) ≤ exp(− ε
2
1λ
2
θ2 ) + exp(− 2ε
2
2λ
2
θ
2 ) ≤ exp(− (λ−λ)
2
4θ2 ) +
exp(− (λ−λ)2
2θ
2 ) ≤ 2 exp(− (λ−λ)
2
4δ2 ). Then, we design a M
under which u → arg max
x∈{u′,v}
f(u, x). Then, according to
our above analysis, we have Pr(f(u, u′) ≤ f(u, v)) ≤
2 exp(− (λ−λ)24δ2 ), which implies Pr(f(u, u′) > f(u, v)) ≥ 1−
2 exp(− (λ−λ)24δ2 ), i.e., Pr(u
{u′,v}→ u′) ≥ 1− 2 exp(− (λ−λ)24δ2 ).
Proof of Corollary 1. Since |λ − λ|/2θ ≥ √2 lnn+ ln 2,
we have (λ−λ)
2
4θ2 ≥ 2 lnn+ ln 2. Then, according to Theorem
1, we have Pr(u
{u′,v}→ u′) ≥ 1 − 2 exp(− (λ−λ)24δ2 ) ≥ 1 −
2 exp(−2 lnn− ln 2) = 1− 1n2 . Then, as n→∞, Pr(u
{u′,v}→
u′) → 1 according to the Borel-Cantelli Lemma, i.e., it is
a.a.s. that u can be successfully de-anonymized from {u′, v}.
Proof of Corollary 2. First, we give the design of
M, which is similar to that in Theorem 1. If λ < λ, M
is designed as M : u → arg min
x∈V2
f(u, x); otherwise, if
λ > λ, M is designed as M : u → arg max
x∈V2
f(u, x).
Then, to prove this corollary, it is equivalent to prove that
∀v ∈ V2 and v 6= u′, it is a.a.s. that M can successfully
de-anonymize u from {u′, v}, i.e., Pr(u {u
′,v}→ u′) n→∞→ 1.
Let E be the event that ∃v ∈ V2 such that M cannot
successfully de-anonymize u from {u′, v}. Then, according
to Boole’s inequality and Theorem 1, we have Pr(E) =
Pr(
⋃
v∈V2,v 6=u′
M cannot de-anonymize u from {u′, v}) ≤∑
v∈V2,v 6=u′
Pr(M cannot de-anonymize u from {u′, v}) ≤∑
v∈V2,v 6=u′
2 exp(− (λ−λ)24δ2 ). Considering that λ 6= λ
and |λ − λ|/2θ ≥ √2 lnn+ ln 2n2, we have
Pr(E) ≤ ∑
v∈V2,v 6=u′
2 exp(−2 lnn − ln 2n2) ≤
2n2 exp(−2 lnn − ln 2n2) = 1/n2. Then, as n → ∞,
Pr(E) → 0 according to the Borel-Cantelli Lemma, which
implies that Pr(u V2→ u′) n→∞→ 1, i.e., it is a.a.s. that u can be
successfully de-anonymized from V2 by M.
Proof of Theorem 2. We employ the same M design as
in Corollary 2 to de-anonymize the users in Vα. Let E be the
event that ∆1 is α-re-identifiable and Ec be its complementary
event. Then, according to Boole’s inequality and Theorem 1,
we have Pr(Ec) = ⋃
u∈Vα
Pr(M cannot de-anonymize u from
{u′, v} for some v ∈ V2 ) =
⋃
u∈Vα
⋃
v∈V2,v 6=u′
Pr(M cannot de-
anonymize u from {u′, v} ) ≤ ∑
u∈Vα
∑
v∈V2,v 6=u′
Pr(M cannot
de-anonymize u from {u′, v} ) ≤ 2αn1n2 exp(− (λ−λ)
2
4δ2 ) =
exp(ln 2αn1n2 − (λ−λ)
2
4δ2 ). Then, we have Pr(E) = 1 −
Pr(Ec) ≥ 1− exp(ln 2αn1n2 − (λ−λ)
2
4δ2 ).
Proof of Corollary 3. Since |λ − λ|/2θ ≥√
2 lnn+ ln 2αn1n2, we have
(λ−λ)2
4θ2 ≥ 2 lnn + ln 2αn1n2.
Then, according to Theorem 2, we have Pr(∆1 is α-re-
identifiable) ≥ 1 − exp(ln 2αn1n2 − (λ−λ)
2
4δ2 ) = 1 − 1/n2.
Then, as n → ∞, we have Pr(∆1 is α-re-identifiable) → 1,
i.e., it is a.a.s. that ∆1 is α-re-identifiable.
Proof of Theorem 3. First, we discuss how to construct
M for u. If λ < λ, M is designed to return Cu as the K
auxiliary users such that they have the Top-K smallest f(u, ·).
Otherwise, if λ > λ, M is designed to return Cu as the K
auxiliary users such that they have the Top-K largest f(u, ·).
Then, we prove the first conclusion of this theorem. Towards
this objective, it is equivalent to prove that ∀v ∈ V2 \Cu, M
can successfully de-anonymize u from {u′, v}. Let E be the
event that ∃v ∈ V2 \ Cu such that M cannot successfully
de-anonymize u from {u′, v}. Then, using Theorem 1, we
have Pr(E) = Pr( ⋃
v∈V2\Cu,v 6=u′
M cannot successfully de-
anonymize u from {u′, v} ) ≤ ∑
v∈V2\Cu,v 6=u′
Pr(M cannot
successfully de-anonymize u from {u′, v} ) ≤ 2(n2 −
K) exp(− (λ−λ)24δ2 ) = exp(ln 2(n2 − K) − (λ−λ)
2
4δ2 ). Thus,
Pr(u→ Cu) = 1−Pr(E) ≥ 1− exp(ln 2(n2−K)− (λ−λ)
2
4δ2 ).
Now, we prove the second conclusion. If |λ − λ|/2θ ≥√
ln 2(n2 −K) + 2 lnn, we have (λ−λ)
2
4δ2 ≥ ln 2(n2 −K) +
2 lnn. Then, we have Pr(E) ≤ 1/n2. According to the Borel-
Cantelli Lemma, we have Pr(E) → 0 as n → ∞, which
implies Pr(u → Cu) n→∞→ 1, i.e., it is a.a.s. that u is Top-K
re-identifiable.
Proof of Theorem 4. In this theorem, we use the same
M as described in Theorem 3 to de-anonymize each user
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in Vα. Now, we prove the first conclusion. Let E be the
event that ∃u ∈ Vα and ∃v ∈ V2 \ Cu such that M cannot
successfully de-anonymize u from {u′, v}. Then, Pr(E) =⋃
u∈Vα
⋃
v∈v∈V2\Cu,v 6=u′
Pr(M cannot successfully de-anonymize
u from {u′, v} ) ≤ ∑
u∈Vα
∑
v∈v∈V2\Cu,v 6=u′
Pr( M cannot
successfully de-anonymize u from {u′, v} ) ≤ 2αn1(n2 −
K) exp(− (λ−λ)24δ2 ) = exp(ln 2αn1(n2 −K)− (λ−λ)
2
4δ2 ). Thus,
we have Pr(Vα : u → Cu) = 1 − Pr(E) ≥ 1 −
exp(ln 2αn1(n2 −K)− (λ−λ)
2
4δ2 ).
For the second conclusion, since |λ − λ|/2θ ≥√
ln 2αn1(n2 −K) + 2 lnn, we have (λ−λ)
2
4δ2 ≥ ln 2αn1(n2−
K) + 2 lnn. Then, we have Pr(E) = 1/n2 and as n → ∞,
Pr(E) → 0 according to the Borel-Cantelli Lemma, which
implies that Pr(Vα : u→ Cu) n→∞→ 1, i.e., it is a.a.s. that ∆1
is Top-K α-re-identifiable.
